On December 8th, 2024, the Assad regime collapsed following an offensive by opposition forces. The offensive was spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and supported mainly by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army as part of the ongoing Syrian civil war that began with the Syrian Revolution in 2011. The capture of the capital Damascus marked the end of the Assad family’s rule, which had governed Syria as a hereditary sectarian totalitarian regime since Hafez al-Assad assumed power in 1971 following a coup d’etat.
As a rebel coalition advanced towards Damascus, reports emerged that Bashar al-Assad had fled the capital aboard a plane to Russia, where he joined his family, already in exile, and was granted asylum.
The swift fall of Assad's regime was met with shock and surprise throughout the world, including the Syrian people. Syrian opposition fighters were themselves reportedly surprised at how quickly the Syrian government collapsed in the wake of their offensive.
The fall of the Assad regime provides both opportunities and challenges to the Turkish government.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressed full support for Syrian rebel groups and called for their unification, urging the international community to support their efforts to take power. He outlined Ankara’s priorities: maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity, achieving a peaceful political transition, and curbing the activities of Kurdish terrorist groups. He added that the Turkish leadership intends to cooperate with the new government in Damascus to ensure stability, reconstruction, and economic development. Fidan further announced the initiation of a process for the repatriation of Syrian refugees. Moreover, he asserted that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which maintain control over the northern region of the country, are closely affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organisation, and ruled out the SDF’s participation in the formation of a new Syrian government unless the group distances itself from the PKK.
The overthrow of al-Assad by the Syrian opposition is a positive development for Ankara. The new government in Damascus is likely to be favourable towards Turkey, which in turn could facilitate the return of Syrian refugees from Turkey. However, the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria, commonly referred to as Rojava and governed by the SDF, will remain a significant challenge for Ankara. Turkey may continue its military operations targeting Kurdish terrorist organisations within this region.
Ankara’s continued support for groups such as the Syrian National Army (SNA), which collaborates with the Turkish armed forces, and Islamist factions within the radical Islamic group known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has created a window of opportunity for Turkey. Turkey’s position in Syria and the Middle East is expected to strengthen at the expense of Moscow and Tehran. Russia’s position weakened as a result of the war in Ukraine, and Iran’s position weakened as a result of Israeli operations. Ankara is likely to play a key role in shaping the organisation of a new system of governance in Damascus, whose stability will have significant consequences for the entire region. Simultaneously, Ankara may become increasingly assertive in its relations with Moscow, whose influence in Syria is diminishing, thereby reducing its capacity to escalate the Syrian conflict in ways that could jeopardise Turkish interests.
Turkey is likely to act as a partner for the new authorities in Damascus, in both political and economic aspects, especially in the period of Syria’s reconstruction and stabilisation. Ankara’s primary goal will be to mediate and support efforts to unify the Syrian opposition (excluding the SDF). Should such unification occur, Turkey will aim to stabilise the political situation in Syria to initiate the relocation of over 3 million Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey. Ankara’s involvement in Syria’s reconstruction will also remain a key priority.